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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the savings and loan scandals of the 1980s, Congress
responded by enacting the Bank and Thrift Fraud Prosecution Act of 1990.' The
Act contains the Continuing Financial Crimes Enterprise statute (CFCE), which
will be the focus of this Comment. In essence, Congress created a new crime
when it enacted the CFCE, ostensibly a white-collar analogue to the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise (CCE) drug law.3 The similarities between the two crimes are
primarily in their structure: both the CFCE and the CCE are "modern compound
1. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4863.
2. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996) (providing the following:
(a) Whoever
(1) organizes, manages, or supervises a continuing financial crimes enterprise; and
(2) receives $5,000,000 or more in gross receipts from such enterprise during any 25-month
period, shall be fined not more than $10,000,000 if an individual, or $20,000,000 if an
organization, and imprisoned for a term of not less than 10 years and which may be life.
(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "continuing financial crimes enterprise" means a
series of violations under sections 215, 656, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1032, or 1344 of this title, or
section 1341, or 1343 affecting a financial institution, committed by at least 4 persons acting in
concert);
see also id. § 215 (West Supp. 1996) (governing the receipt of commissions or gifts for providing loans); id.
§ 656 (prohibiting bank embezzlement); id. § 657 (West Supp. 1996) (regulating thrift institution
embezzlement); id. § 1005 (West 1976) (prohibiting fraudulent bank entries); id. § 1006 (West 1976)
(regulating fraudulent credit institution entries); id. § 1007 (West 1976) (legislating against false statements
or willful overvaluation of security when dealing with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. § 1014
(West 1976) (governing fraudulent loan or credit applications);,id. § 1341 (West Supp. 1996) (restricting mail
fraud); id § 1343 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting wire fraud); id. § 1344 (West Supp. 1996) (proscribing bank
fraud).
3. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (,Vest Supp. 1996); see id. (providing in part that:
(a) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to
a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provisions of title 18,
[United States Code], or $2,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $5,000,000 if the defendant
is other than an individual ....
(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" defined. For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a
person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter 11 of this chapter the
punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources).
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crimes" 4 in that they require the commission of a series of specified predicate
offenses, and the establishment of a "criminal enterprise.
5
Apparently, the purpose of the CFCE is to punish those responsible for
causing the rash of savings and loan failures in the 1980s. This is evidenced by
the retributive tenor of many comments made by members of Congress. 6 To
effectuate its objective, Congress passed the CFCE, which some called in official
records the "Financial Crime Kingpin Statute." 7
After chronicling the legislative history and background of the CFCE in Part
II, Part III of this Comment will scrutinize this rarely used statute8 in light of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.9 The United States
Supreme Court has determined that traditional double jeopardy analysis is not
helpful to courts when dealing with modern compound crimes.'0 This Comment
4. To facilitate efficiency, throughout the remainder of this Comment the term "modem compound
crime" will be used to describe offenses like the CFCE, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO), and the CCE, where the commission of a series of underlying predicate offenses is required to convict
a defendant. In contrast, traditional composite offenses such as felony-murder will be described simply as
"compound crimes." See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 661-62 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (using the term
compound crime to describe felony-murder).
5. See supra note 2 (disclosing the text of the CFCE statute); see also supra note 3 (providing a partial
text of the CCE statute).
6. See, e.g., S & L Investigation: Hearing of the Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance Subconnittee of the House Banking Connittee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter S&L
Investigations] (statement of Rep. Annunzio, Chair) (stating that "these crooks are responsible for one-third,
one-half or maybe even more of the savings and loan cost. The American taxpayer will be forced to pay $500
billion or more over the next 40 years, largely because of these crooks"); see also infra, note 15 (containing
further quotes from members of Congress).
7. 136 CONG. REc. S18301, S18322 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990).
8. See Peter Mantius, Insurance Fraud Artist to Aid Investigators, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 2, 1993,
at D3 (stating the CFCE was "rarely used"). In the five years since the passage of the CFCE, there has only
been one incident listed in a case reporter in which prosecutors have obtained a conviction under the CFCE.
United States v. Harris, 805 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In an unreported case, Gary Lefkowitz was
convicted under the CFCE as the mastermind of a real estate fraud scheme. David Phelps, Lejkowitz Guilty on
47 Charges, STAR TRIB., July 22, 1995, at IA.
Additionally, the author of this Comment has culled newspapers throughout the nation, and only two
other cases in which a defendant has been charged with the CFCE have been found. Recently, Steven Rosen
and Ann Denise Huffman were indicted under the CFCE for their participation in a credit card fraud scheme.
Richard Green, Jr., 16 Defendants Indicted it Fraud, POST & COURIER, Aug. 11, 1995, at Al. In the second
case, Alan Teale pleaded guilty to the CFCE charge based on his involvement in an insurance fraud scheme.
Mantius, supra at D3.
9. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (reading that "no... person [shall] be subject for the same offen[s]e to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
10. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390-92 (1992) (stating that the lesser included offense
analysis is not very helpful when dealing with modem compound crimes); United States v. Garrett, 471 U.S.
773, 787-89 (1985) (distinguishing simple crimes from modem compound crimes, and cautioning against using
lesser included offense principles of double jeopardy to crimes which occur in different places over a long
period of time); United States v. Crosby, 20 F.3d 480, 485 (1994) (stating "multi layered conduct offenses,
such as CCE and RICO violations, are generically distinct in the double jeopardy arena"); see also infra notes
141-76, and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend accepted double jeopardy
analysis to modem compound crimes).
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argues that the Court's traditional double jeopardy test should be available to
defendants, regardless of the crime charged."
Further, this Comment addresses double jeopardy issues arising from the use
of modem compound crimes not yet decided by the Supreme Court. Currently,
there is no formulation accepted by the Supreme Court that guards against
fragmenting one criminal enterprise into several charges of the CFCE. Another
issue left unresolved is whether collateral estoppel should apply to modem
compound crimes and their predicates. Parts III.G. and Ill.H. examine these
matters.
Lastly, while Department of Justice guidelines limit the scope of prosecutions
that may implicate double jeopardy issues, this particular policy confers no
substantive right upon defendants. Therefore, this policy offers defendants no real
protection. This is addressed in Part 111.I.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONTINUING FINANCIAL CRIMES ENTERPRISE
The rash of failed and crippled financial institutions known as the Savings
and Loan Crisis of the 1980s was perhaps "the biggest disaster in public finance
since the Depression."' 2 Estimates of the amount it will take to pay off the
obligations of the failed Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) and the wounded Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are as
high as $500 billion.'
3
Numerous commentators believe that factors such as rising interest rates and
a slumping real estate market led to the collapse of most failed institutions.'
4
However, many members of Congress perceived that criminal activity within
savings and loan institutions, and not market forces, caused the crisis.' 5 Despite
11. See infra notes 177-248 and accompanying text (describing traditional double jeopardy
jurisprudence and its application to the CFCE).
12. David E. Rosenbaum, The Savings Debacle: A Special Report: A Financial Disaster Wiih Many
Culprits, N.Y. Timrs, June 6, 1990, at AI.
13. Id.; see S&L Investigations, supra note 6 (indicating that the cost to taxpayers could be as high as
$500 billion over the next 40 years).
14. See Bruce A. Green, Srnposiinn: Financial istitutions and Regulation, the S & L Crisis: Death
and Transfiguration: After the Fall: The Crimtinal Law Enforcement Response to the S & L Crisis, 59
FORDHAM L. REv. S155, S155 (1991) (stating that many commentators attributed the savings and loan crisis
to many factors, such as the rise of market interest rates, inflation of the 1980s, the decline of the real estate
market in the 1980s, governmental regulatory failure, and legal restrictions on the ability of S&Ls to diversify
their portfolios); Kenneth E. Scott, NeverAgain: Tire S & L llailont Bill, 45 Bus. LAW. 1883, 1884-93 (1990)
(forwarding six reasons for the failure of the FSLIC: (1) Savings and loans were poorly designed financial
intermediaries; (2) the deposit insurance system was flawed; (3) inflation of 1980; (4) lack of a presidential
response; (5) poor management strategies by those running the institutions. and (6) the actual outcome of those
poor management decisions).
15. See 136 CONG. REc. S17595, S17601 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(proclaiming that "[t]he white-collar criminals who are responsible for this massive ripoff must be brought to
justice"); id. (stating "[m]uch of the S&L crisis can be directly attributed to fraud and insider abuse; William
1292
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specific declarations by individuals both inside and outside Congress, that the role
of criminal activity in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s was minimal, or at
least overstated, 6 Congress passed legislation designed to punish the supposed
wrongdoers. t7 This Congressional reaction resulted in the passage of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 225, criminalizing a CFCE.t8
Functionally and structurally, the CFCE resembles the CCE,19 passed in 1970,
upon which the CFCE was largely based.20 Both statutes create crimes that are
compound in nature, meaning that elements of the CFCE and the CCE include
other substantive offenses.2'
The CFCE has relatively few components: a defendant must have a
managerial or supervisory role in a criminal enterprise, and the enterprise must
gross $5 million or more within a two year period.22 A criminal enterprise is the
commission of a "series" of underlying crimes specifically delineated in the
statute itself, which includes offenses such as bank fraud, bank embezzlement,
Seidman, head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, estimates that between 30% and 60% of S&L
failures can be linked to fraud and criminal wrongdoing"); 136 CONG. REc. S9477, S9484 (daily ed. July 11,
1990) (statement of Sen. Wirth) (stating that "[t]here is no question ... fraud and other crimes played a
significant role in the S&L crisis"); 136 CONG. REC. at S9478 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Heinz) (stating that "the savings and loan crisis is far and away the largest theft and heist in American
history").
16. See Bank and Thrift Fraud: Hearing of the Senate Banking Committee, 101st CONG., 2d Sess.
(1990) (statement of Sen. Garn) (stating that "the fundamental problem of the S&L crisis started back in the
early 1970s due to interest rate mismatch. It didn't have anything to do with crime, fraud, and abuse at the
time"); Green, supra note 14, at S167 (implying that Congress may have overstated the criminal element of
the savings and loan crisis to shift blame away from themselves during election season); Scott, supra note 14,
at 1892-93 (hinting that industry and supervisory officials have overstated the amount of loss due to fraud, and
stating that "[iut seems probable that only rarely was fraud a deliberate strategy employed from the start...
[fraud] appears more often to have been a desperate final period expedient"). But see Mary Hull, Feds Expand
Use of Bank Fraud Task Force, THE RECORDER, Oct. 11, 1991, at 2 (estimating that of the 622 thrifts that
failed since August 1989, and were under Resolution Trust Corporation control in 1991, 38% of the institutions
were at least tainted by fraud and/or insider abuse); S & L Conunission May Recommend Merger of Bak-Thrlift
Insurance and Regulator, 60 BNA's BANKING REP., Jan. 25, 1993, at 102 (reporting that estimates of the thrift
industry's losses due to fraud range from three to 25%).
17. See supra note 15 (evidencing Congress' intention to bring those who were responsible for the S&L
crisis to justice). Congress may have been acting because of purely political motives. In all likelihood, the
perpetrators of any schemes that led to the widespread failure of savings and loans completed their acts prior
to the passage of the CFCE. Certainly, these individuals are beyond the ambit of the CFCE. See U. S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Congress from passing ex post facto laws).
18. See hifra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (describing a CFCE).
19. See Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Oiher Complex Crimes: The Transformation of American
Criminal Law?, 2 Wm. & MARY BiLL or RTs. J. 239, 255 (1993) (stating the CFCE's liability structure is
"functionally identical to CCE").
20. See Green, supra note 14, at S174 (stating, in reference to the CFCE, "in 1990 Congress adopted
a new criminal provision patterned on the 'drug kingpin statute' to deal with the most serious offenders").
21. See supra notes 2-3 (disclosing the full text of the CFCE and partially setting forth the CCE).
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996).
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and wire fraud affecting a financial institution.Y According to the vast majority
of case law interpreting the closely related CCE, a "series" is three violations.24
Punishment under the CFCE is severe in the context of white-collar crime.2
5
A defendant convicted under the statute faces a minimum of ten years in prison
and a maximum of a life sentence without parole.2 Additionally, heavy fines may
be imposed: up to $10 million if the defendant is an individual, and $20 million
if the defendant is an organization.27 A life sentence without parole is the second
most severe federal punishment next to the death penalty,28 thus the severity of
the penalties available under the CFCE is unsurpassed in the arena of white-collar
crime. 29
As with any powerful weapon, the CFCE may have some unwanted collateral
effects. The remainder of this Comment addresses whether the application of the
CFCE potentially violates the constitutional right to be free from double
jeopardy."
23. Id.
24. See United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 1082 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating "die three offenses
necessary to constitute a series"); United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding
ajury instruction requiring three violations of federal narcotics laws); United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100,
1103-05 (7th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging most circuits define a series as three violations). The Seventh Circuit
does not include a drug conspiracy as counting toward the series, and therefore only two substantive crimes
are required. Id. at 1104. The court came to this conclusion because a drug conspiracy is a lesser included
offense of the CCE, and to require three offenses for a series, then to tell the jury that a conspiracy counts as
one of those three offenses, would engender confusion. Id. However, the court did feel that "[t]his brings us
into harmony in result, although not in exposition, with the seven other circuits that set a minimum of three
violations and allow the included conspiracy to serve as one." Id. at 1105.
25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West Supp. 1996) (regulating bribery of public officials and witnesses
and having a maximum sentence of 15 years); id. § 656 (West Supp. 1996) (governing bank embezzlement,
imposing a maximum 30 year sentence and $1 million fine); id. § 1341 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting mail
fraud, with a maximum sentence of five years in most eases, but 30 years maximum if the fraud affects a
financial institution); id. § 1343 (West Supp. 1996) (governing wire fraud and imposing a maximum sentence
of five years, unless the fraud affects a financial institution, in which case the maximutn sentence is 30 years);
id. § 1344 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting bank fraud and carrying with it a maximum sentence of 30 years
and up to a $1 million fine). However, the CFCE statute carries with it a possible life sentence, and a fine of
up to $10 million for an individual, and up to $20 million for an organization. h.. § 225 (West Supp. 1996).
26. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996). A life sentence without parole is the second-harshest penalty
under the federal criminal system: the ultimate penalty is death. Id. § 3591 (West Supp. 1996).
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996).
28. Id. § 3591 (West Supp. 1996).
29. See 136 CONG. REc. S17595, S17601 (daily ed. October 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden) (stating
that the CFCE was part of "the toughest white-collar crime bill in U.S. history"); see also supra note 25
(contrasting the penalties available under the CFCE with those available under other white-collar crimes).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offen[s]e to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
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III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Double Jeopardy Clause is deceptively simple: "[N]or shall any person
be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...
1931 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject
has been anything but simple. This complexity is largely the result of a lack of
continuity, as exemplified by the case of Grady v. Corbin.33 The Supreme Court
overruled Grady in 1993 after a mere three year tenure as the controlling law in
double jeopardy cases dealing with successive prosecutions.
4
To obfuscate matters further, justices have advocated divergent tests over the
years to attempt to deal with the key issue in double jeopardy cases, that is what
constitutes the "same offense." 35 Due to this intellectual tangle, the lower courts
have had trouble deciphering the language of the United States Supreme Court
in this area, causing a great deal of confusion. 6
While a treatise can be written on the theoretical underpinnings of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, this Comment discusses only the basic principles of double
jeopardy. 7 These principles will then be applied to the CFCE.
A. The Basics of Double Jeopardy
North Carolina v. Pearce38 forwarded the definitive statement of the interests
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause: "It protects against a second pro-
secution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
31. Id.
32. See Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (observing that the law of double jeopardy
"is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator"); see also
Brenner, supra note 19, at 968 (stating that "double jeopardy principles are complex, uncertain, and difficult
to apply").
33. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
34. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (overruling Grad).
35. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 786 (1985) (stating that for a double jeopardy claim
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, the "critical inquiry" is whether two offenses are considered
the "same offense"); see also Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704-05 (mandating a return to the Blockburger "same
elements" test by a 5-4 majority); Grady, 495 U.S. at 521 (establishing a "same conduct" test for successive
prosecutions by a 5-4 majority); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(advocating that the court should adopt a "same transaction" test); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932) (originating the test that bears its name: "whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not").
36. See Fernandez v. United States, 500 U.S. 948,948 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (commenting on
the "evident disarray among the Courts of Appeals" regarding double jeopardy).
37. For those who wish to delve deeply into the subject, there are many articles that discuss double
jeopardy in substantial depth. See generally Brenner, supra note 19; William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law
of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REv. 411 (1993); Anne B. Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against
Successive Prosecutions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Model, 2.5 CONN. L. REv. 95 (1992); George C.
Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. RE-v. 827.
38. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense." 39 Moreover, Green v. United States40 arti-
culated the underlying rationale of the Double Jeopardy Clause, expressing the
need to protect individuals from prosecutorial oppression and harassment. The
court specifically feared that prosecutors would practice their presentations
numerous times until they got it "right," and convict potentially innocent
defendants. 1
When a defendant presents a double jeopardy challenge by alleging that the
state is prosecuting the defendant under two statutes that are really the "same
offense," Garrett v. United States defines the analytical starting point.42 The first
question to ask is "whether the legislature ... intended that each violation be a
separate offense. If Congress intended that there only be one offense.., there
would be no statutory authorization for a subsequent prosecution.., and that
would end the double jeopardy analysis.' 43 In other words, if a legislative body
intended for crime A and crime B to be the same crime, then the government
cannot bring both charges based on the same event. This threshold test announced
in Garrett applies to all three protections defined in Pearce, which stated that the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal and after a conviction, as well as bars multiple punishments for the same
offense.44 Once the prosecution shows that Congress intended two separate
offenses,4 a court will proceed to the next step: whether the prosecution comports
with the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. 6
This first step quoted above is generally moot as it seems highly unlikely that
a legislative body would intend for two separate statutes to be the same offense.
39. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.
40. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
41. See Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88 (indicating that "'the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him ... to live in a continuing state of anxiety... as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty"); see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,41 (1982) (declaring that the Double
Jeopardy Clause "prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through
successive attempts at conviction"); cf Diron, 509 U.S. at 710, 11 n.15 (1993) (commenting that prosecutors
are not likely to abuse their discretion because of pragmatic concerns such as heavy case loads and judicial
economy).
42. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
43. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778. The Double Jeopardy Clause indicates that if a defendant is not charged
with the "same offense," constitutional protections will not attach. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.
45. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 (1932) (originating the so-called "Blockburgcr
test" to ascertain whether a legislative body intended that two statutes should be separate offenses by
determining whether the statutes have mutually exclusive elements). This same elements test has become the
standard for double jeopardy analysis. hd.
46. See Garreti, 471 U.S. at 786 (stating "[h]aving determined that Congress intended ... a separate
offense... we must now determine whether prosecution.., is constitutional under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment").
1296
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Therefore, the primary query in a double jeopardy challenge is whether a
defendant is being prosecuted twice for the "same offense.
47
Using the "same offense" analysisg, a successful double jeopardy defense
would arise in the following scenario. A court convicts a defendant of bank
robbery in State A on November 1. State A charges the defendant with the same
bank robbery in State A on December 1. State A is prosecuting the defendant
twice for the same offense after being convicted for that offense, by the same
sovereign. This is barred by the second prong of Pearce.45 Therefore, if the
government attempted to prosecute the charges brought on December 1, the
defendant would have a successful double jeopardy claim.
1. Multiple Punishment in a Single Action
When the federal government brings all charges against a defendant in a
single proceeding, legislative intent analysis merges with constitutional analysis.
If Congress intended separate crimes, then the defendant has no double jeopardy
claim so long as all charges are brought in the same proceeding.49 Therefore, the
double jeopardy inquiry for cases implicated under the third "protection"
established in Pearce (barring multiple punishments for the same offense) ends
at the intent stage.
To aid the court in determining statutory intent, courts use the test set forth
in Blockburger v. United States.50 Blockburger stated that when each offense
requires proof of a fact or an element which the other does not, then the offenses
are not the same for double jeopardy purposes.5 ' The Blockburger formulation
may be conceptualized as follows: if one were to lay the elements of statute A
over the elements of statute B, and each offense has an edge which protrudes
from one but not the other, then the offenses are not "the same," and multiple
punishment in the same action would be permitted. On the other hand, if there are
no protruding edges, then a court may conclude that the statutes are the same
under Blockburger, as other factors are relevant.
47. See id. (proclaiming that the "critical inquiry" in a Double Jeopardy claim under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is whether two offenses are considered the "same offense").
48. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after a conviction).
49. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,366 (1983) (holding that with respect to cumulative sentences
imposed in a single trial, the only function of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent the imposition of
greater punishment than the legislature intended); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) (stating
that "the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of
what punishments the Legislative Branch intended"); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980)
(indicating that the Double Jeopardy Clause simply precludes federal courts from imposing consecutive
sentences in a single trial unless authorized by Congress).
50. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
51. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
1297
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In multiple punishment cases, the Blockburger formulation is merely a rule
of statutory construction, and not absolutely binding.5 2 Therefore, even if the
statutes -under examination are the same under a Blockburger test, if other
evidence shows that the legislature intended separate crimes, then there will be
no double jeopardy bar.
Once a court determines that a legislative body has intended two separate
crimes, the query ends; the prosecution of multiple offenses in a single
proceeding is allowed. 3
2. Successive Prosecutions
As with multiple punishment cases, the key issue is whether a violation
charged in the second prosecution is the "same offense" as the offense previously
prosecuted.Y A defendant may not be prosecuted in a subsequent proceeding for
the same offense after he has been convicted or acquitted of that offense.55 In
making this determination, a Blockburger analysis 56 is also used to conduct a
constitutional analysis in cases of successive prosecutions, just as it is used above.
However, when ascertaining whether two crimes are the "same offense" in
cases of successive prosecutions, the Blockburger test mentioned in the previous
section is dispositive 7 If each statute in question does not have different
elements, then they are the "same offense. 58
By sustaining a defendant's double jeopardy claim based upon a Blockburger
analysis alone, the Supreme Court has granted a higher quantum of protection to
individuals in cases of successive prosecutions.5 9 In multiple punishment cases,
52. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493,499 n.8 (1984) (stating that even if the crimes are the same
under Blockburger, if it is evident that the legislature authorized cumulative punishments, a court's inquiry
ends); Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366 (holding that when all charges are brought in a single proceeding, the Double
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature
intended); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344 (noting that the question of what is allowed by the Constitution in the
realm of multiple punishments in a single Blockburger trial is not different from asking what the legislature
intended); Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 (indicating that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes consecutive
sentences imposed by a federal court in a single trial only to the extent that Congress authorizes).
53. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689.
54. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 786 (1985) (explaining that the critical inquiry in a
double jeopardy claim is whether two offenses are the "same offense").
55. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969).
56. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (stating that double jeopardy would present a bar if 'each
provision requires proof of fact which the other does not").
57. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,704-05 (1993).
58. See Blockburger, 284 US. at 304 (commenting that two crimes are the same offense if each offense
does not require proof of a fact which the other offense does not).
59. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (relating the various double jeopardy tests for
multiple punishments and successive prosecutions, respectively); cf. Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199,
2204 (1995) (citing Dixon for the proposition that the same double jeopardy analysis applies in both multiple
punishment and multiple prosecution situations); Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704-05 (stating in dicta that with the
exception of the overruled Grady, no case law supports the proposition that multiple punilshment cases are to
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legislative intent to create different offenses controls despite a contrary result
under the Blockburger test.60 In contrast, Blockburger is determinative in
successive prosecution cases, even if the prosecution produces evidence that the
legislature intended two separate offenses.
The extra measure of protection granted defendants who face successive trials
exists because the potential harm is patently greater than when they face multiple
charges in a single trial. The prosecution gains the ability to force a defendant
through the expense and rigor of a new trial, and the prosecution can test its case
by charging a narrow offense in the first trial, then it can broaden the scope of the
prosecution in the second trial.' Moreover, there are heightened constitutional
and societal interests at stake when a person faces the prospect of repeated
governmental harassment and oppression.62 The prospect of being dragged into
court time and time again to face accusations based upon the "same offense" is
exactly what the Double Jeopardy Clause condemns. 63
3. The Lesser Included Offense Analysis
In Brown v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court enunciated the concept
of the "lesser included offense." 64 The defendant in Brown stole an automobile
on November 29, 1973, and was apprehended on December 8, 1973.65 The local
be treated differently than successive prosecution cases). James A. Shellenberger et al., The Lesser Included
Offense Doctrine and the Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79
MARQ. L. REv. 1, 115 n.390 (1995) (citing Dixon to support the conclusion that the United States Supreme
Court has disapproved of the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be interpreted differently depending
on whether the procedural setting is one of multiple punishments or multiple prosecutions); WAYNE R. LAFAVE
ET AL., CRININAL PROCEDURE § 17.4 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that the Supreme Court appears to have rejected
the notion that the same test applies to successive prosecution and multiple punishment issues). Note that the
discussion of the court in Dixon dealt with whether something more protective than Blockburger exists in
successive prosecution cases, not whether something less than Blockburger should be applied in multiple
punishment cases. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 701-05. Moreover, it is clear that two separate tests have indeed been
accepted by the United States Supreme Court. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
less protective test in cases of multiple punishment, whereby legislative intent overrides a finding of the "same
offense" under Blockburger alone).
60. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (describing double jeopardy law in situations where
all charges against a defendant are brought in a single trial).
61. See Poiilin,supra note 37, at 115-16 (describing some of the advantages gained by the prosecution
from successive prosecutions).
62. See id. at 115 (stating that freeing the government to bring successive prosecutions invites abuses
against which the Constitution is intended to protect), id. at 117 (commenting that successive prosecutions
exact a substantial toll from the criminal justice system).
63. See, e.g., Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,41 (1982) (asserting that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
the state front refining its trial strategies through successive attempts at prosecution); Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (stating that the state should not use its power and resources to make numerous
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense).
64. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977) (explaining that "we conclude today that a lesser
included and a greater offense are the same under BIlockburger').
65. Id. at 162
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police charged Brown with "joyriding," or driving a vehicle without the consent
of the owner.66 Brown pleaded guilty to this charge, and was sentenced. 67 Upon
the defendant's release, the local police charged Brown with motor vehicle theft.68
The United States Supreme Court found that joyriding was a "lesser included
offense" of motor vehicle theft, hence they were the "same offense," and barred
the second prosecution.69
Brown stated that if a "greater" offense includes all of the elements of a
"lesser" crime, the offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes, regardless
of the sequence of prosecution.70 In light of stare decisis, it is worth mentioning
that, the lesser included offense analysis is merely a subset of the Blockburger
formulation. That the lesser included offense model and Blockburger are con-
sistent becomes clear upon an explication of the lesser included offense as defined
by Brown.
To begin, Professors LaFave and Israel have used the following model to
describe the concept of the lesser included offense: imagine two circles, A and B,
constituting the elements of two statutes. If the circles merely overlap, or are
mutually exclusive, the offenses are not the same. On the other hand, if those
elements form a set of concentric circles, then one statute is a lesser included
offense of the greater.7' Therefore, they are the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes, as each statute does not "require proof of a fact which the
other does not. 72 The "lesser" offense is necessarily proven by the "greater"
offense, as all of the elements of the "lesser" are subsumed by the "greater," and
the government may not proceed with a prosecution under statute A in one
proceeding and a prosecution under statute B in another.73 Hence, the "lesser
included offense" analysis is completely consistent with the Blockburger
formulation as a lesser included offense does not contain any elements that the
greater does not.74 During the same term Brown was decided, the United States
Supreme Court issued a per curian opinion in the case of Harris v. Oklahoma.75
Ostensibly, Harris served to close a subtle loophole left open by Brown. As
Brown is a logical outgrowth of Blockburger, only the elements specified in the
statutes in question are relevant in determining whether one statute is a lesser
66. Id.; see id. (noting that the defendant was charged with joyriding as was then defined by section
4549.04(d) of the Ohio Revised Code).
67. Brown, 432 U.S. at 162.
68. Id.; see id. (stating that the defendant was subsequently charged with auto theft as was then defined
by section 4549.04(A) of the Ohio Revised Code).
69. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169-70.
70. Id. at 169.
71. LAFAvr L-r AL., supra note 59, at § 17.4.
72. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
73. See Browt, 432 U.S. at 169 (pronouncing that the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecutions
of a lesser included and greater offense, regardless of the sequence).
74. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
75. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
1300
1996 / Continuing Financial Crimes Enterprise
included offense of the other.76 In Harris, the court's quandary arose from the
following facts: the defendant was convicted in state court of felony-murder using
robbery with a firearm as the underlying felony; he was subsequently indicted for
robbery with a firearm.77 The loophole resulted from the fact that the precise
elements of robbery with a firearm were not delineated in the greater offense of
felony-murder; the felony-murder statute merely incorporated all felonies by
reference.78 Therefore, under a stringent Blockburger/lesser included offense
analysis, each crime does require proof of a fact which the other does not.
Without much discussion, the court determined that such a reading would be too
exacting and stated: "When as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot
be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution . . . ."
While it has been suggested that the Harris decision was an exception to the
Blockburgerllesser included offense test, this Comment will treat Harris as a
mere modification of Blockburger, since only elements of crimes are ultimately
relevant. 0 When the greater crime lists component lesser offenses, the lesser
offenses are defacto elements of the greater crime, even when the full text of the
underlying predicate is not included in the greater offense. With the CFCE, one
possible element of a criminal enterprise is bank fraud.8' Needless to say all of the
elements of bank fraud are subsumed by the CFCE, even if they are not explicitly
set forth in the CFCE itself. Therefore, Harris is not truly an exception to
Blockburger.
In sum, under Harris, as long as the greater crime necessarily proves the
lesser crime, the two statutes exist in a relationship of greater and lesser included
offenses. They are, therefore, the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
B. Reaffirmation of the Traditional Blockburger Test: United States v.
Dixon
2
While the test the United States Supreme Court has used to determine what
constitutes the same offense in successive prosecutions has changed throughout
76. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (stating that the Blockburger test emphasizes the elements of the two
crimes in question).
77. Harris, 433 U.S. at 682.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. In his dissent in a subsequent case, Justice Scalia considered Harris an acceptable "exception" to
Blockburger. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by United States V.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
81. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996).
82. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
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the years,83 the recent case of United States v. Dixon solidified the preeminence
of Blockburger.s4 In Dixon, the court overruled the "same conduct" test estab-
lished in Grady v. Corbin,8s and returned to Blockburger's "same elements test.
86
The Dixon court reasoned that the broad protection afforded defendants through
the "same conduct" test of Grady7 "lacked Constitutional roots," and therefore
must be overruled.88
In reaching its decision, the Grady court stated that Blockburger did not
satisfactorily protect defendants from the myriad burdens of multiple trials. 89 To
justify a rule beyond Blockburger, the majority relied in large part upon dictum
announced in two cases. In Illinois v. Vitale,9° the Court stated that since the
defendant had already been convicted for conduct that was an essential element
of the present crime, double jeopardy barred-the present prosecution. 9' Moreover,
in Brown, the Court asserted that Blockburger was not the only standard for
determining whether successive prosecutions involve the same offense.92 From
this, a new double jeopardy standard was born in the form of the "same conduct
test," prohibiting a subsequent prosecution when the government must prove
previously prosecuted conduct to establish an essential element of the present
crime(s). 93 The "same conduct" formulation was to have a very short life-span,
and the "same elements" analysis of Blockburger would soon become the relevant
inquiry.
Merely three years after Grady was decided, the United States Supreme Court
reversed its field, and returned to Blockburger in Dixon.94 While Justice Scalia
was able to muster a majority vote to mandate this return, the United States
Supreme Court Justices disagreed as to how the test should be applied. 95 Only one
other justice (Justice Kennedy) agreed with Justice Scalia, who stated that the
83. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 521, overriled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993)
(establishing that a subsequent prosecution is barred if the state must prove, as an essential element of the
present crime, conduct which was proven in a previous prosecution) (5-4 majority).
84. 509 U.S. 688 (1993); see id. at 704-05 (overruling Grad%, explicitly, as it lacked historical roots,
and pronouncing a return to the Blockburger test) (5-4 majority).
85. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
86. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704-05.
87. The "same conduct" tests prevents a subsequent prosecution if the state must prove, as an essential
element of the present crime, conduct that was proven in a previous prosecution. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521.
88. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704-05.
89. Grady, 495 U.S. at 520.
90. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
91. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 420.
92. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977).
93. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521.
94. Dlxon, 509 U.S. at 704-05.
95. Id. at 688.
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specific facts of a case should be considered when analyzing whether two statutes
constitute the "same offense."
On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in part and
dissented in part, argued that crimes should be analyzed in the "ordinary sense"
for double jeopardy purposes.97 Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the
Blockburger rule appears closer to a literal reading of the rule's original
formulation, since only the elements of the two statutes in question are relevant
in a Blockburger analysis.9 Chief Justice Rehnquist's "ordinary sense" version
of Blockburger was endorsed by Justices O'Connor and Thomas.99
The disagreement between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
becomes clear upon a brief discussion of one of the two combined cases decided
in Dixon. The trial court issued a contempt order which forbade the defendant
from violating any criminal offense.' ° Thereafter, the defendant was arrested on
possession of cocaine charges, and convicted under both the contempt and
possession charges.' 0' The issue was whether the contempt order and the cocaine
possession charge were the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
Justice Scalia determined that any criminal offense was a lesser included
offense of the contempt order, as proof of violation of the contempt order proved
the underlying violation of possession.102 Therefore, the two crimes were the
"same offense" for double jeopardy purposes, and Blockburger barred any sub-
sequent prosecution of the underlying offense.'0 3
Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's "ordinary sense" formulation, a successive
prosecution should not have been barred, because possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute is not a lesser included offense of contempt of court in the
96. Id. In Dixon, the defendant was convicted for violating a contempt order which forbade him from
violating any criminal offense; the defendant subsequently was arrested and indicted for possession of cocaine.
Id. at 691-92. Justice Scalia determined that the possession charge was a lesser included offense of the
contempt order, as groof of violation of the contempt order necessarily proved the underlying violation. Id. at
698-700. Therefore, the charges were the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes, and the Double
Jeopardy Clause barred any subsequent prosecution of the underlying offense. Id. at 700-01.
97. See id. at 713-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that
contempt of court should be viewed in its ordinary sense).
98. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871))
(indicating that the Blockburger test is a comparison of two statutes: "a single act may be an offense against
two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the
other").
99. DLron, 509 U.S. at 713-14.
100. Id. at 691-92.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 699.
103. Id. at 700. The underlying offense was possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. at 691.
Note the interesting procedural posture: Justice Scalia only convinced one other Justice to both acquit the
defendant and return to Blockburger. However, Justice Scalia was able to establish two different majorities.
One majority decided to acquit the defendant. Id. The other majority voted to return to Blockburger. Id.
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ordinary sense.1t° What the Chief Justice meant by "ordinary sense" is not entirely
clear, as some case-specific facts must be taken into account. What is clear is that
he seemed most concerned with whether the elements of the lesser crime are
necessarily subsumed by the greater offense.'05
To illustrate his point, Chief Justice Rehnquist contrasted the felony-murder
case of Harris v. Oklahoma'06 with the facts of Dixon. 107 The defendant in Harris
was convicted of felony-murder in which robbery with a firearm was the under-
lying felony. The defendant was subsequently prosecuted for robbery with a
firearm."0" The second prosecution was properly barred as a second prosecution
for the same offense;' 9 robbery with a firearm was a lesser included offense of
felony-murder, which used robbery with a firearm as an element."0 From this
perspective, a clearer picture of "ordinary sense" develops. Chief Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that robbery with a firearm is necessarily a step towards the
commission of felony-murder, as it establishes an element of felony-murder.',
Moreover, the relationship between the two statutes in question was important to
the Chief Justice; he implied that a generic reference in one offense that
incorporates the elements of another offense would mean that one offense was
indeed a lesser included offense of the other in the ordinary sense.1
2
In contrast, possession'with intent to distribute is certainly not a necessary
step in the commission of contempt of court; possession of cocaine does not
satisfy an element of contempt, nor does it lead to the establishment of an element
of contempt in the ordinary sense.13 Additionally, the contempt of court statute
did not make-any generic references to any underlying crimes. Therefore, using
this formulation, robbery with a firearm is a lesser included offense of felony-
murder in the ordinary sense, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
is not a lesser included offense of contempt of court in the ordinary sense.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not subsequently clarified
exactly how to apply Blockburger, at least one lower federal court has addressed
this question. In United States v. Adams,"14 the eleventh federal circuit considered
whether a Blockburger analysis should be performed on the elements of the
statute alone, or whether the facts of the case as detailed in the indictment should
104. Id. at 713-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 719-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
107. DLron, 509 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Harris, 433 U.S. at 682.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. DLron, 509 U.S. at 719-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. See id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that, in the
present case, there was no "generic reference" in the crime of contempt of court to the underlying charge that
incorporated the elements of the purported lesser offense).
113. Id. at 719-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. 1 F.3d 1566 (1Ith Cir. 1993).
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be considered."' 5 The Adams Court endorsed Chief Justice Rehnquist's ordinary
sense version of Blockburger, as only the elements of the statutes in question
were relevant." 1
6
While the preceding summation has been anything but exhaustive, this
section has disclosed that in the context of multiple punishments in a single pro-
secution, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent a court from
imposing greater punishment than that intended by the legislature. " 7 By contrast,
in successive prosecutions, the government may not proceed with the second
prosecution when the two statutes at issue are the same under a
Blockburger/lesser included offense analysis-when the conviction of a greater
crime cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime."t
8
C. Application of the Blockburger/Lesser Included Offense Test to the
CFCE
This Comment will now apply the principles discussed above to the CFCE,
and conclude that multiple punishment under the CFCE and its predicates in a
single action does not violate the current double jeopardy doctrine." 9 Regarding
successive prosecutions, this Comment will show that the CFCE and its
predicates are the greater and the lesser included offenses, respectively. 20 There-
fore, a prosecution of the CFCE should not be pursued in a separate action apart
from its predicates. However, current United States Supreme Court dicta indicates
that lesser included offense analysis does not control modem compound crimes.1
2 1
In the final part of this section, this Comment will argue that the United States
Supreme Court's rationale for not applying, the lesser included offense analysis
to modem compound crimes is contrary to the spirit of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 22
115. Adams, I F.3d at 1572.
116. See id. at 1574 (holding that the Blockburger test is to be applied to the elements of a statute, not
to the averments that go beyond the statutory elements).
117. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (explaining double jeopardy jurisprudence in the
context of multiple punishment in a single action).
118. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text (describing double jeopardy law in the area of
successive prosecutions).
119. See hifra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (concluding the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
bar the imposition of multiple punishments under the CFCE and its predicates).
120. See intfra notes 127-38 and accompanying text (arguing that the CFCE and its predicates exist in
a greater/lesser included offense relationship).
121. See infra notes 141-76 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme Court's
reluctance to extend lesser included offense analysis to modern compound crimes such as the CFCE).
122. See infra notes 177-203 and accompanying text (criticizing the United States Supreme Court's
current posture regarding lesser included offense analysis and modern compound crimes).
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1. Multiple Punishment
Hypothetically, Mr. X is indicted for five counts of bank fraud and the CFCE,
in federal district court in 1992. He argues that the CFCE and the underlying
predicates are the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes, and he may not
receive cumulative punishment if convicted on all counts. Mr. X argues that a
Blockburger/lesser included offense analysis will show that the bank fraud
charges require proof of the same facts that CFCE does. As bank fraud is but one
element of the CFCE, all of the" elements of bank fraud are subsumed by the
CFCE. Therefore, bank fraud and the CFCE are the same offense for double
jeopardy purposes since bank fraud is a lesser included offense of the CFCE.
Unfortunately for Mr. X, a person faced with defending against the CFCE and
individual predicate offenses in a single proceeding has little chance of success,
as legislative intent controls despite a favorable outcome under Blockburger.
23
The government would simply need to show that Congress intended for bank
fraud and the CFCE to be separate offenses.'24
Although analyzing the CFCE and its predicates in light of Blockburger alone
would save the defendant from cumulative punishment, in the context of multiple
punishment in a single action, Blockburger is merely a tool of statutory con-
struction to aid a court in determining legislative intent.'
2 5
Contrary congressional intent unambiguously states that the CFCE and its
predicate offenses are separate crimes in the context of multiple prosecutions; the
statute's legislative history reveals that Congress wished to address a specific new
criminal.' 26 From this a court could draw the inference that Congress intended for
bank fraud and the CFCE to be two separate offenses. Therefore, as it is unlikely
that a defendant would have a cognizable double jeopardy claim if the govern-
123. See Missouri v. Hunter 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) (holding, "[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences
imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended"). The court also noted that regardless of whether
two statutes are the same under Blockburger, legislative intent controls. Id. at 368-69; see Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) (stating that the question of what is allowed by the Constitution in the realm
of multiple punishments in a single trial is not different from asking what the legislature intended); Whalen
v. United States,445 U.S. 684,689 (1980) (indicating that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes consecutive
sentences imposed by a federal court in a single trial only to the extent that Congress authorizes).
124. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69 (stating that upon clear showing of legislative intent to authorize
cumulative punishments, that intent will control regardless of the outcome of a Blockburger analysis).
125. See Albeniaz, 450 U.S. at 340 (stating that in cases of multiple punishment in a single trial, the
Blockburger test is merely a rule of statutory construction, and is not controlling where there is clear legislative
intent to the contrary).
126. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S9488, S9488 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of Sen. Shelby)
(proclaiming that the CFCE "creates a new, strong deterrent to white collar crime by authorizing life
imprisonment for 'S&L kingpins.') (emphasis added); 136 CONG. REc. S 17595, S 17601 (daily ed. October,
1990) (statement of Sen. Biden) (stating that punishment doled out under the CFCE will be severe for "so-
called S&L kingpins").
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ment brings all charges in a single proceeding, multiple punishment in single
proceeding would be allowed.
2. Successive Prosecutions
As mentioned earlier, legislative intent is not dispositive in cases of
successive prosecutions; the analysis should proceed further.'2 7 On its face, the
CFCE and its predicates present a clear-cut case of the "lesser included offense"
aspect of the "same offense" rule.'28 The following hypothetical is illustrative: In
1992, the federal government prosecuted Mr. X on five counts of bank fraud .
29
Presume that the government knew Mr. X had managed a total of five people
acting in concert, and the enterprise grossed $10 million in an eighteen-month
span. Further, assume Mr. X is convicted on all counts.
Subsequently, in 1994, the U.S. Attorney's office indicts Mr. X under the
CFCE, and uses the prior bank fraud charges as the predicate offenses for the
CFCE charge. Under a Blockburgerlesser included offense analysis, although the
CFCE charge involves proving more elements than mere bank fraud, 30 proof of
the CFCE necessarily proves the bank fraud charges; therefore, the bank fraud
charges do not require "proof of a fact which the other does not."' 3' As a result,
the bank fraud charges are "lesser included offenses" of the CFCE, and are the
"same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.132 Thus, the prosecution in 1994
should be barred, as violative of the second prong of North Carolina v. Pearce,
33
which prohibits the prosecution of the same offense after a conviction.134
The preceding analysis would also withstand an "ordinary sense" interpre-
tation of Blockburger, which Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated in Dixon, as the
CFCE specifies the necessary underlying offenses. 35 Under the Chief Justice's
logic in Dixon,'36 the supervision of one bank fraud count is necessarily a step in
the commission of a Continuing Financial Crimes Enterprise. 37 While one bank
127. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
128. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,169 (1977) (forbidding successive prosecutions for a greater and
lesser included offense, regardless of the sequence).
129. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West Supp. 1996) (defining "bank fraud").
130. See id. (governing bank fraud); cf id. at § 225 (West Supp. 1996) (describing the CFCE statute).
131. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
132. Id.
133. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
134. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 (staling the double jeopardy clause protects "against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal").
135. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996); see United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 717-18 (1993)
(Rehnquist, Ci., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a generic reference to an underlying
felony within a felony-murder statute was sufficient to incorporate the particular underlying felony as a lesser
included offense in Harris).
136. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 719-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
that greater and lesser included offenses require the lesser offense to be necessarily included in the greater).
137. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (Vest Supp. 1996).
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fraud violation does not establish an element of the CFCE in its entirety, it is
certainly a component in the statute's definition of a "continuing financial crimes
enterprise."'38 Thus, in the "ordinary sense" of the CFCE, bank fraud is a lesser
included offense.
However, as developed below, the double jeopardy provisions enunciated in
Pearce and Blockburger probably would not apply to the fact pattern stated
above. t39 As a result, Mr. X would be subject to the second prosecution in 1994
under the modem compound crime of CFCE,140 despite the fact that bank fraud
is a lesser included offense of the CFCE in the ordinary sense. This apparent
exception to the lesser included offense doctrine may be extracted upon an
examination of United States Supreme Court case law.
D. Why a Traditional Lesser Included Offense Analysis Would Not Be
Applied to the CFCE
1. Garrett v. United States
Garrett v. United States 4' is the leading United States Supreme Court case
dealing with the relationship between a modem compound statute such as the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 42 the CCE, 43 or
the CFCE'4 and its predicates in a relevant double jeopardy context.' 45
In Garrett, the defendant operated an extensive drug operation from 1976 to
1981.' 46 In 1981, he was charged with federal substantive drug offenses in the
138. See id. (defining a "continuing financial crimes enterprise" as a series of delineated violations,
including bank fraud as one of the specified crimes).
139. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390-92 (1992) (intimating that lesser included offense
analysis is not helpful in analyzing subsequent conspiracy prosecutions and CCE violations); Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773, 789 (1985) (cautioning against using lesser included offense logic when analyzing
complex, multi-layered conduct); see also Tat Man J. So, Comment, Double Jeopardt', Complex Crimes and
Grady v. Corbin, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 351, 362 (1991) (stating that a blanket exception exists to lesser
included offense analysis for complex-crimes).
140. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996).
141. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
142. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West Supp. 1996).
143. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West Supp. 1996).
144. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (Vest Supp. 1996).
145. Garrett, 471 U.S. 773; see id. (deciding a double jeopardy case arising front the use of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 848, the CCE statute). An earlier case, Jeffers v. United States, also addressed a double jeopardy challenge
arising out of the use of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977). However, the Jeffers
court decided a slightly different issue: whether conspiracy is a lesser included offense of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848,
which includes a quasi-conspiracy element of acting "in concert with." Id. at 146-47. A plurality of the court
concluded that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848. Id. at 150. However, the plurality
allowed the prosecution of the conspiracy charge in one trial and the criminal enterprise charge in another
because the defendant had expressly requested separate trials. Id. at 152-54.
146. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 775 (1985).
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state of Washington. 47 Simultaneously, he was under investigation in Florida for
violations of the CCE.148 The defendant's request to have all of the charges
against him consolidated into one trial was denied. 49 Two months after the defen-
dant pleaded guilty to the charges stemming from the activities in Washington,
he was indicted in Florida under the CCE.'50 In the course of the subsequent trial,
the government used many of the Washington activities to support the CCE
charge. 5 ' The defendant argued that a CCE conviction was barred as violative of
double jeopardy since he had previously pleaded guilty to lesser included offenses
of the CCE.2 - The Court upheld the second prosecution. 53 The fact that all of the
activities which comprised the CCE charge had not been completed at the time
the defendant was indicted under the lesser charges in Washington was
dispositive.'i 4
This fact proved determinative as the Court in Garrett invoked the exception
announced in Diaz v. United States,155 which allows a subsequent prosecution for
the "same offense" when the second offense has not been completed by the time
of the indictment of the first offense. 56 Therefore, the application of the Diaz
exception was enough to decide the issue in Garrett. No double jeopardy claim
was available to the defendant since the crimes comprising the CCE violation had
not been completed by the time the defendant was indicted in Washington.'57
However, the Garrett court did not stop there. 58 In dicta, the Court stated,
"significant differences caution against ready transportation of the 'lesser
included offense' principles of double jeopardy from the classically simple
situation presented in Brown to the multi-layered conduct, both as to time and to
place, involved in this case."' 59 In cautioning against the use of lesser included
147. Id. at 775.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 776.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 787.
153. See id. at 793 (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated under the facts of the
present case).
154. d. at 791.
155. 223 U.S. 442 (1912); see id. at 448-49 (granting the exception on the following facts: the defendant
was initially prosecuted on assault and battery charges; after the defendant's trial on the assault and battery
charges, the victim died from injuries suffered as the result of the battery). The State then indicted the
defendant on homicide charges. Id. The United States Supreme Court did not bar the subsequent prosecution.
Id.
156. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 792-93 (holding that as the continuing criminal enterprise had not been
completed at the time the Washington charges were brought, the Diaz: rule would allow the Washington
charges to be used as a predicate offense).
157. Id. at 791.
158. ld at 790. The Court stated it had serious doubts as to whether the offense to which the defendant
pleaded guilty in Washington was a "lesser included offense" of the CCE. 1d.
159. Id. at 789.
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offense analysis with modern compound crimes, the Garrett court focused upon
purported discrepancies between the case at hand and the facts of Brown v.
Ohio.160
The Court differentiated between a single course of conduct, as described in
Brown, and the intricate, multi-layered conduct of the drug operations in
Garrett.16' The Garrett court expressed reluctance to extend the lesser included
offense analysis to the latter largely because it could not conceptualize the latter
as a "single course of conduct," and because in Brown, the defendant was "simul-
taneously committing both the lesser included ... and the greater felony.'
' 62
Furthermore, the majority justified its stance by forming the following
argument: to force the government to choose between prosecuting the defendant
presently for the underlying predicates or releasing the defendant and letting him
complete his enterprise would be absurd.' 63 Certainly, an inflexible application
of Blockburger would foreclose a prosecution of a modern compound crime upon
the previous prosecution of its underlying predicates.' However, the very
exception used by the court in Garrett answers this dilemma. The Diaz exception
would allow the government to prosecute uinderlying predicates in one trial, then
the CFCE in a subsequent trial, so long as the CFCE was not complete at the time
the government indicted the defendant on the predicates. This directly addresses
the Garrett court's concern that the government will be forced to either
prematurely pursue the predicates or unnecessarily delay prosecution of the
defendants.
In addition to the dicta, perhaps the most complete policy arguments
forwarded by a member of the United States Supreme Court against finding that
a modem compound crime and its predicates are the "same offense" are found in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Garrett.'65 She pointed out that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not absolute, and accommodations must be made to forward
society's interest in prosecuting those who have violated the law.' 66 Moreover,
she echoed the majority's stance that the Double Jeopardy Clause should not be
used to force the government's hand, either by waiting for a defendant to
establish an "enterprise," or by prosecuting a defendant prematurely, charging
him with only a limited number of predicates.' 67
160. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
161. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789; see supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (describing the relevant
facts of Brown).
162. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 787-89.
163. ld. at 785-86.
164. Id. at 798 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 795-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 798 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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2. United States v. Felix
In many respects, United States v. Felix' 8 embraced the Garrett dicta
regarding "multi-layered conduct." In Felix, the Court considered using the lesser
included offense logic in analyzing the prosecution of a conspiracy and a
previously prosecuted substantive crime.' 69 The defendant in Felix operated an
illicit drug facility in Oklahoma, and while attempting to obtain precursor
chemicals in Missouri, the defendant was apprehended and charged with federal
substantive drug offenses in Missouri.'70 Subsequently, the government charged
the defendant with federal drug conspiracy charges in Oklahoma, and used the
Missouri acts to prove the Oklahoma conspiracy.'
7'
Alluding to Garrett, the Court stated, "[r]eliance on the lesser included
offense analysis . . . is therefore much less helpful in analyzing subsequent
conspiracy prosecutions... just as it falls short in examining CCE offenses.' 72
As with Garrett, the Supreme Court's discussion of the lesser included offense
analysis when scrutinizing modern compound crimes was dicta. 73 To decide the
case, the Felix court relied upon an axiom of double jeopardy jurisprudence:
conspiracies to commit crimes are separate from the substantive crimes them-
selves.174 Therefore, any further discussion by the United States Supreme Court
regarding the wisdom of using the lesser included offense logic when analyzing
modem compound crimes was unnecessary.
In both Garrett and Felix, the United States Supreme Court refused to extend
traditional double jeopardy jurisprudence to modern compound crimes,' 75 yet it
has not announced a rule that would satisfactorily address double jeopardy and
168. 503 U.S. 378 (1992).
169. Felix, 503 U.S. at 381-83.
170. Id. at 380.
171. Id. at 380-84
172. Id. at 389-90. The quotation is merely dicta, as the court ultimately based its holding on the premise
that conspiracies to commit crimes have been considered separate from the actual substantive crimes long
before the "same conduct" test advocated by the defendant had been adopted. Id. at 1384; see United States
v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947) (stating that agreements to perform illegal acts are distinct from the acts
themselves); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (holding that a conspiracy to commit a
crime, and the substantive crime itself are not the "'same offense").
173. The court held that the prosecution of a conspiracy in a case in which the government relied upon
previously prosecuted overt acts does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, by relying on the traditional rule
that a substantive crime, and the agreement to commit that crime, are not the same offense. Felix, 509 U.S. at
389-90.
174. See id. at 389-90 (noting that specific cases the defendant wished to invoke predated the rule that
a conspiracy is not the same offense as a substantive crime for double jeopardy purposes); see also Bayer, 331
U.S. at 542 (stating that agreements to perform illegal acts are distinct from the acts themselves); Pinkerton,
328 U.S. at 643 (holding that a conspiracy to conuuit a crime, andthe substantive crime itself are not the "same
offense").
175. See supra notes 141-76 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme Court's
current stance regarding the use of the lesser included offense'analysis to modern compound crimes).
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modem compound crimes. All of the Supreme Court's dicta indicate that if a
situation akin to the aforementioned Mr. X's would arise, double jeopardy
protection would not be available to him.176 This vacuum is not supportable in
light of relevant precedent.
E. Criticism of the United States Supreme Court's Position
The basic protections of Blockburger should be available to defendants in
cases involving successive prosecutions of the CFCE and its predicate offenses.
Any concerns that the United States Supreme Court may have in applying
Blockburger to modem compound criMes are sufficiently addressed through the
exceptions announced in Diaz v. United States'
77 and Brown v. Ohio. 78
As alluded to above, the United States Supreme Court has directly discussed
the issue of double jeopardy in the context of a modern compound crime and its
predicates only once, in Garrett. There, the Court stated its reluctance to apply the
lesser included offense analysis to compound crimes. 1
79
The two primary reasons the Court gave for cautioning against the use of the
lesser included offense analysis for double jeopardy issues arising from modem
compound crimes were: (1) A defendant charged with two simple crimes, as in
Brown, engages in a single course of conduct from a spatial and temporal pers-
pective; 80 and (2) a defendant charged with two simple crimes commits both
176. See Felix, 503 U.S. at 390-91 (intimating in dicta that lesser included offense analysis would not
be helpful in the context of a compound crime). Yet the court did not forward an analysis that it would favor
in modem compound crime cases. Id.; see Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 787-90 (1985) (expressing
in dicta the difference between modern compound crimes and simple fact patterns arising from traditional
crimes, and cautioning against extending lesser included offense analysis to the former); supra notes 141-67
and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Garret).
177. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
178. 432 U.S. 161 (1977); see Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789-90 (addressing the concern that, "the Double
Jeopardy Clause may be employed to force the Government's hand"). The Court seemed troubled by the notion
that the prosecution would either have to withhold charging the defendant with the lesser crimes until the
requirements were met to allow the defendant to be indicted on the greater charge, or the government would
have to indict the defendant on the greater charge before the defendant was even finished committing the
greater charge. Id. at 789-90; see Browna, 432 U.S. at 169 n.7 (stating that a double jeopardy exception may
exist when the government cannot proceed on a greater charge if all of the facts necessary to charge the
defendant with that crime have not been uncovered by the state despite the exercise of due diligence); Diaz,
223 U.S. at 448-49 (exempting from double jeopardy analysis successive prosecutions when the second offense
is not completed at the time of the indictment of the first offense). Applied to the Court's concerns in Garrett,
the prosecution would not be barred from using the lesser offense previously prosecuted per the Diaz
exception, since the greater crime was not complete at the time of the indictment of the lesser offense. Id.
179. See Felix, 503 U.S. at 390-91 (stating lesser included offense analysis falls short in examining the
compound crime of CCE); Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789 (cautioning against the use of lesser included offense
analysis when dealing with multilayered conduct, which is often present in a compound crime).
180. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 787-89 (intimating that a defendant such as the one in Brown engages in
a single course of conduct, and cautioning against using a lesser included offense to complex crimes as they
are different from Brown, both as to "time and to place").
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crimes simultaneously.t"t These distinctions are not satisfactory and will be
discussed in turn below.
First, although running a financial crimes enterprise may not be a "singular
act" in the normal sense, Congress has deemed the requisite series of acts discreet
and singular enough to define those acts as a specific crime. 182 Additionally, the
Garrett court placed an emphasis upon the fact that the defendant's acts occurred
over a long time and in many locations." 3 However, from temporal and spatial
perspectives, the facts in Brown may present no more of a "single course of con-
duct" than running a financial crimes enterprise. The conduct alleged in Brown
occurred over eight days' 84 An individual could violate the CFCE in eight days;
the defendant need only supervise the commission of three bank fraud actions, for
example, that gross more than $5 million. Such a defendant may conduct all of
his activities from the same office. From a time and place viewpoint, so important
to the Court in Garrett, this hypothetical is just as singular an act as the crimes
committed in Brown.
Granted, due to the complex nature of the CFCE, it seems likely that a
defendant will often (but not invariably) commit the acts in many places and over
a long period of time. Yet that fact should not dictate the parameters of consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Time and time again, the United States Supreme Court has
invalidated significant intrusions into personal freedoms simply because the
government was justified in its actions from a purely statistical perspective. 85
Indeed, as Justice Stewart pointed out in Faretta v. California,186 "[p]ersonal
liberties are not rooted in the law of averages."'8 7 Therefore, reliance on mere
quantitative probabilities is misplaced.
The second distinction raised by the Court in Garrett, that the defendant in
Brown committed both offenses simultaneously, is equally without merit. 88 Even
181. See id. at 789 (stating that the defendant in Brown was committing both the greater and the lesser
offenses simultaneously, and the Garrett defendant simply did not commit the underlying predicates and the
CCE concurrently).
182. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that a continuing financial crimes enterprise
requires the commission of a series of criminal acts, and may occur over a two year period).
183. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789 (distinguishing the classically simple situation presented in Brown
from the "multilayered conduct, both as to time and to place. . :'present in Garrett) (emphasis added).
184. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 162-63 (indicating that the defendant illegally took possession of a car on
Nov. 29, and continued to have possession until Dec. 8).
185. Cases involving the Fourth Amendment are instructive. For example, for any non-minor seizure,
the police must have some quantum of individualized suspicion, be it probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
See generailly Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A bare assertion that
a defendant superficially fit within a statistical profile is insufficient. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,440-
42 (1979) (vacating a state court decision that validated a seizure on such grounds).
186. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
187. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
188: See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789 (stating that the defendant in Brown simultaneously committed both
the greater and lesser included offenses, and that the same "simply is not true of Garrett").
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with the so called "simple situation presented in Brown,"' 9 a defendant may not
necessarily commit both crimes simultaneously.
Consider the following variation on the facts in Brown: suppose the defendant
did not intend to deprive the ovner of his vehicle permanently when he first took
the car; he only wished to embark upon a "joyride." Only after driving the car
around for a couple of days did the defendant decide that he wanted to deprive the
owner of his car. Under these facts, the defendant did not commit "auto theft"
until he developed the requisite mens rea for auto theft.19 Therefore, the defen-
dant did not commit both crimes until the threshold point when he decided to
deprive the owner of possession permanently.
The same could be the case in a CFCE prosecution. A defendant may commit
acts that have met all the requirements of the-CFCE, except that the enterprise has
not yet grossed $5 million. The defendant continues his bank fraud scheme, and
eventually he reaps $5 million from the criminal enterprise. Again, the defendant
will, at some point, be violating both the CFCE and the bank fraud statute, but not
until some "threshold" point is reached. As a result, differentiating modern com-
pound crimes from regular offenses on the basis that a defendant commits both
offenses simultaneously only with simple offenses is based on two erroneous
assumptions: (1) That a defendant charged with two simple crimes always com-
mits both crimes simultaneously, and (2) that a defendant charged with a modem
compound offense and its predicates never commits both crimes simultaneously.
As mentioned above, Felix merely parroted Garrett in many respects, and the
Court stated in a conclusory manner that lesser included offense analysis is "much
less helpful" for modern compound crimes.'9 ' The Court never articulated what
might be helpful.' 92
In the preceding cases, the United States Supreme Court expressed reluctance
to extend double jeopardy to modern compound crimes merely because the con-
duct involved is often complex, and usually extends over a long period of time.' 93
Yet Congress deemed it proper to criminalize this complex behavior. It seems
incongruous that a legislative body may take into account multi-layered conduct
189. Id.
190. See Omo Rnv. CoDE ANN. § 2913.02 (Baldwin 1994) (defining "theft" generally); id. at § 2913.03
(Baldwin 1994) (governing unauthorized use of a vehicle).
191. Felix, 503 U.S. at 1390-91.
192. The posture of the United States Supreme Court may be best encapsulated by Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Whalen v. United States. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist stated that the lesser included offense analysis is "perhaps even misdirected" when
considering modem compound crimes and their predicates, yet he gave no reason why it is misdirected, and
offered no solution to the problems faced by a defendant such as Mr. X. Id. at 708-09.
193. See FeL', 503 U.S. at 389-91 (stating that the lesser included offense analysis is much less helpful
when analyzing the modem compound crime of the CCE); Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789 (cautioning against the use
of the lesser included offense logic in cases involving multilayered conduct); see also So, supra note 139, at
362 (stating that there may be an exception to successive prosecution double jeopardy protection for compound
crimes).
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when criminalizing an act or acts, yet when constitutional rights are at stake, the
United States Supreme Court refuses to acknowledge those rights because of the
very conduct Congress deemed criminal. Although logical symmetry is not a
central tenet of the law,' 94 double jeopardy protection is neither a transitory right
nor a "fragile guarantee... ."" As stated in Benton v. Maryland,t 6 "the double
jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in
our constitutional heritage. . . ."9' Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's contention
that predicate offenses to a modern compound crime and the modern compound
crime itself are clearly not "same offenses,"' 98 upon an examination of the
policies behind double jeopardy proscriptions, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
conclusion is wrong. A defendant could be subjected to dire legal consequences,
based upon offenses that have already been proven in a previous prosecution. As
the Mr. X hypothetical points out, the government could convict a defendant of
bank fraud in one trial, and subsequently prove that charge again in a CFCE
prosecution; this is simply antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ultimately,
with a right as fundamental and basic as the protection against double jeopardy,
the United States Supreme Court should not merely dismiss the potential for
prosecutorial oppression mentioned in Green'99 simply because the lesser in-
cluded offense analysis is, in the opinion of the Court, "much less helpful. '20"
Although overruling mere dicta is impossible, the United States Supreme
Court should rethink the position taken in Garrett. This Comment has shown that
the predicates of the CFCE are, under a literal reading of the relevant rule, lesser
included offenses of the CFCE.2°' While the Court did give justifications for
cautioning against the use of the lesser included offense analysis with modern
194. See, e.g., OUVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAw 244 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard University Press 1963) (1881) (stating: "The distinctions of the law arc founded on experience, not
on logic").
195. Bromit, 432 U.S. at 169. In Justice Powell's majority opinion, he stated that the "Double Jeopardy
Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units." Id. at 169.
196. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
197. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
198. See Felix, 503 U.S. at 385-86 (discussing the defendant's interlinked activities in Oklahoma and
Missouri, and concluding that none of the offenses were in any sense the "same offenses" because the conduct
occurred in different times and places and because there was no common conduct).
199. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (stating that the state should not use its
power and resources to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense).
200. See Felix, 503 U.S. at 390-91 (proclaiming that the lesser included offense analysis is not very
helpful when dealing with a compound crime such as the CCE in the Garrett case).
201. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the CFCE and its underlying
predicates exist as greater and lesser included offenses).
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compound crimes,2' as argued above, these reasons are not persuasive. 3 There-
fore, the CFCE and its underlying predicates should be considered the "same
offense" in cases of successive prosecutions.
F. The Supreme Court Should Extend the Lesser Included Offense Analysis
io the CFCE
A simple lesser included offense test applied to the CFCE and its predicates
satisfactorily protects the constitutional rights of defendants against vexatious,
duplicative trials, in which the prosecution could continually hone its presentation
until the government achieves a guilty verdict.2 4 Although several proposed
double jeopardy tests exist that would grant a defendant much greater protection
than Blockburger, for example the same transaction test,20 5 the same conduct
test,206 and the same evidence test, 2 7 the ambitions of this Comment do not
stretch so far.
Whether the Blockburger formulation is, from a theoretical perspective, the
best method for protecting a defendant from double jeopardy is not currently at
issue. Arguably, Blockburger affords only minimal protection.20 8 However, from
a practical perspective, Blockburger is the only formulation expressly accepted
by the United States Supreme Court .2 1 This Comment recognizes that defendants
are especially at risk of double jeopardy with modern compound crimes, due to
202. See supra notes 141-176 and accompanying text justifying the Court's caution against using the
lesser included offense analysis).
203. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text (dissecting the rationale of the Supreme Court in
this area).
204. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (addressing the justification for double jeopardy by
noting that "the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and
prosecutors").
205. See id. at 170 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that while he agrees with the majority's result, he
stands by his thesis that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that all charges must be brought in a single
proceeding which springs from a "single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction" (quoting Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,453-54, & 454 n.7 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
206. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents
a subsequent prosecution if, to prove an essential element of a crime, the government will have to prove
conduct previously prosecuted), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
207. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 573 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a same
evidence test is the better approach, which would preclude the prosecution from harassing the accused with
repeated trials and convictions using the same evidence).
208. This is so because a legislative body could circumvent the Mlockburger test by merely modifying
the underlying "predicates" so that they are not quite equivalent to existing substantive statutes. Congress
would merely need to avoid creating a "crime within a crime." Instead of stating that a series of batk fraud
prosecutions is required to form an "enterprise," the statute could state that something less than bank fraud is
enough. If bank fraud contains the elements A. B, and C, and the modern compound crime's "predicate"
contains only elements A and B, then each statute would contain elements that the other did not, and they
would not be "same offenses" for double jeopardy purposes.
209. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 (overruling the same conduct test of Grady and returning to the same
elements test of Blockburger).
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the wide variety of possible crimes that could be lesser included offenses of the
CFCE, RICO or CCE.2'0 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court should
be willing to apply the accepted double jeopardy mode of analysis to modem
compound crimes such as the CFCE. As demonstrated above, the predicate
crimes of the CFCE are the lesser included offenses of the CFCE in the "ordinary
sense." 21' This Comment simply advocates the proposition that they should be
treated as "same offenses" for double jeopardy purposes.
The concept of treating underlying predicate crimes as lesser included
offenses of modem compound crimes is certainly not a revelation. In his
extensive review of RICO, Barry Tarlow stated that "[t]he relationship of a RICO
offense to the predicate offenseg is clearly that of greater and lesser-included
offenses."212 Furthermore, in a case decided soon after Garrett, a federal appellate
judge pronounced: "Neither the words nor the logic of the opinion imply that a
predicate offense would not be considered a lesser included offense within a CCE
charge once the CCE had been completed. 21 3 Indeed, in her concurrence in
Garrett, Justice O'Connor gave additional support to the assertions of this
Comment, as she stated that a defendant's double jeopardy claim is much more
compelling when the predicate offenses and the modem compound crime have
all been completed.2 t4
Certainly, governmental and societal interests call for a balanced approach to
this issue. The interests of the government in promptly and aggressively
prosecuting modem compound crimes are adequately protected through two
common sense exceptions to double jeopardy analysis. The first was enunciated
in Diaz v. United States,215 and the second was in Brown v. Ohio.216 These cases
allow for a subsequent prosecution of the "same offense" under either one of the
210. See Stanley Arkin, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness and Big-Bang Statutes, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 1993,
at 3 (stating that the advent of modern compound crimes such as RICO, CCE, and CFCE allows for a greater
risk of prosecutorial vindictiveness); Poulin, supra note 37, at 136 (proposing that modern compound crimes
create a greater risk of fragmented prosecutions); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 423-24
(1983) (commenting that dangers exist to individual ights and liberties because of the breadth of the modern
compound crime of RICO).
21 1. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text (showing that previously prosecuted predicate
crimes are lesser included offenses of the CFCE).
212. Tarlow, supra note 210, at 404-05.
213. United States v. Guthrie, 789 F.2d 356,362 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
214. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 799 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that a
defendant's interest in finality would be much more compelling in a case in which he was prosecuted for an
underlying predicate, did not conmmit any further criminal acts, and was later prosecuted for a compound
crime). This is in contrast to the actual defendant in Garrett, who continued his criminal enterprise after he was
indicted for some of the underlying predicates. Id. at 799; see supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text
(setting forth the Mr. X hypothetical).
215. 223 U.S. 442 (1912); see id. at 448-49 (holding that where a subsequent offense has not been
completed at the time of the indictment of the first offense, double jeopardy protections will not apply).
216. 432 U.S. 161 (1977); see id. at 169 n.7 (stating that "[a]n exception may exist where thd State is
unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that
charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence!).
1317
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
following circumstances: if the second crime was inchoate at the time of the
indictment of the first,217 or if the government, using due diligence, has not
uncovered the necessary facts to charge the defendant with the second offense.2 8
So that the theories enunciated in Brown and Diaz are not totally in the
abstract, let us return to Mr. X. As indicated earlier, if the Blockburger test was
applied to the facts given,2 9 a second prosecution should be barred as the "same
offense," since any of the predicates are "lesser included offenses" of the
CFCE. 20 The crimes prosecuted by the government in the first trial did not
"require proof of a fact which the other does not."'22' The Blockburger rule would
protect a defendant from the possibility of the government fragmenting the
charges and "subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal, and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety ....22
In the hypothetical above, the government knew that the defendant had met
all the criteria for a CFCE charge, yet the government did not add that charge to
the initial indictment. The use of the Blockburger test would properly bar a
second prosecution.
Rational policy supports this result as the pursuit of a modern compound
crimes conviction can be a fertile breeding ground for prosecutorial abuse. 223 It
is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment to allow a prosecutor to try a defendant for
underlying predicate offenses in one trial, when the prosecution knows that the
defendant has also met the criteria for the CFCE offense, then in a second trial,
to prosecute the CFCE offense. In theory, the trial of-the underlying predicates
can serve as a dress rehearsal for the CFCE prosecution. With the second trial, the
prosecutor has been able to rehearse the presentation, which essentially allows the
217. See Diaz, 223 U.S. at 448-49 (holding that as the second crime had not been completed at the time
of the first crime's indictment, the government could proceed with a second prosecution without fear of a
double jeopardy defense).
218. See Broiw,432 U.S. at 169 n.7 (articulating that an exception to the lesser included offense doctrine
for successive prosecutions may exist where the state cannot proceed on the greater charge because the
government failed to discover the facts necessary to prosecute the defendant with the greater charge, even after
exercising due diligence).
219. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (describing the Mr. X hypothetical). In 1992, Mr.
Xwas charged and convicted in federal court of five counts of bank fraud. Id. It was assumed the government
knew the defendant supervised a total of five people acting in concert, and the enterprise grossed $10 million
in an 18-month span (these factors meet the elements of the CFCE). Id. In 1994, the federal government
decides to charge the defendant with the CFCE. Id.
220. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the CFCE and its underlying
predicates are the "same offense" in successive prosecutions).
221. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
222. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
223. See Arkin, supra note 210, at 3 (stating that the advent of compound crimes such as RICO, CCE,
and CFCE allows for a greater risk of prosecutorial vindictiveness); Tarlow, supra note 210, at 423-24
(commenting that dangers exist to individual rights and liberties because of the breadth of the modem
compound crime of RICO).
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prosecutor the opportunity for a "second bite at the apple" in the subsequent
trial.
224
However, if at the time of the first indictment, the government was not aware
that the defendant's bank fraud scheme had grossed over $5 million, the Brown
exception could be invoked. The relevant portion of Brown stated that if the
government failed to discover the facts necessary to establish the second charge
even after the exercise of due diligence, the defendant would have no double
jeopardy claim. Thus, if the government used due diligence in its investigation,
and did not know that the defendant's scheme had grossed $5 million, the double
jeopardy protections afforded by Blockburger would not apply.
The "due diligence" standard is not an overly burdensome, nor unfair,
requirement of the government.2 6 So long as the government conducts an
investigation that is objectively reasonable, the due diligence standard is met.227
For example, in United States v. Tolliver,-22 a due diligence determination in a
double jeopardy context will be made based upon "facts reasonably available to
the government at the time. 229
224. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 518 (addressing the possibility of a state being able to "rehearse its
presentation" in instances of successive prosecutions, which may increase the risk of an erroneous conviction);
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,41 (1982) (observing that the Double Jeopardy Clause "prevents the State from
honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction"); United States
v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11 th Cir. 1993) (expressing concerns over multiple prosecutions), rev'd on
otliergrounds, 983 F.2d 1004 (1993).
The integrity of our system of justice would be tlsreatened if prosecutors could 'shop' for a
favorable judge or jury until they found one willing to convict, or until a judge imposed the
sentence the prosecutors felt was appropriately severe. It would upset the already delicately
balanced equities... if prosecutors could continue to charge the defendant ... until they perfected
their presentation of the evidence with several 'rehearsals.'
Id.
225. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 n.7 (stating that "[aln exception may exist where the State is unable
to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge
have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence").
226. See United States v. Boldin, 772 F.2d 719, 732 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (holding that the government met
its due diligence standard when an informant who was a key factor in a second prosecution did not begin
cooperating with the government until seven months after the first trial); cf Maza, 764 F. Supp. at 1454-55
(finding that the government did not meet the due diligence standard when all the information used in the
second prosecution was in the hands of the prosecutor in the first prosecution, yet the first prosecutor failed
to charge the defendant with the crimes charged in the second prosecution).
227. See Chance v. F. N. Wolf& Co., No. 93-2.390, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 27508, at *11 (4th Cir. Sept.
30, 1994) (stating that due diligence is an objective standard which requires a "reasonable investigation"). The
Chance case did not deal with governmental investigation, but rather with the responsibility of a civil plaintiff.
Id.
228. 61 F.3d 1189 (5th Cir. 1995).
229. Tolliter, 61 F.3d at 1211. In T"llhver, the government did not know that the defendant was involved
in a larger conspiracy when it initially indicted him. Id. at 1211. Moreover, evidence implicating the defendant
in some of his most culpable conduct in the second charge was not even suspected at the time of the initial
prosecution. Id. at 1212.
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The Diaz exception offers an alternate means for the government to avoid the
application of Blockburger when prosecuting a defendant under the CFCE in one
trial and the underlying predicates in another. In Diaz, the State charged the
defendant with assault and battery for kicking his victim.2 3' Mr. Diaz was found
guilty of this offense, and he paid a fine; subsequently, the victim died of wounds
inflicted by the defendant. 232 As a result of the victim's death, the prosecutor
charged the defendant with homicide. -33 In refiuting the defendant's argument that
he was being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, the Court stated that
it was not possible for the defendant to be placed in jeopardy for the homicide
charge until the victim had died.23 Likewise, if a "financial crimes enterprise"
was not complete when charges alleging underlying predicates were brought, the
government could raise the Diaz exception to defeat a double jeopardy defense
to a subsequent prosecution of the CFCE. For example, if a defendant's scheme
had grossed only $2 million dollars at the time he was indicted for bank fraud, the
government could still charge the defendant under the CFCE at a later date, when
the enterprise actually did gross $5 million.
The Brown and Diaz exceptions to double jeopardy analysis directly address
Garrett, in which the court feared that a strict interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause would hamstring prosecutors..2 35 The Court did not want to force
the government to either bring actions prematurely, perhaps before the pro-
secution is ready, or idly wait until the modern compound crime had been
completed before bringing charges.2 36 By allowing the government the limited
ability to prosecute the underlying predicate offenses in one trial, and the CFCE
in another, without fear of a double jeopardy bar, federal prosecutors could
choose their strategy, and the government would not be compelled either to
prosecute prematurely or to delay prosecution.
The proposal of this Comment to use the lesser included offense analysis
may have some detractors who will argue that the well-established conspiracy
exception should apply to modern compound crimes such as the CFCE. The basis
230. See Diaz, 223 U.S. at 448-49 (holding that when the second crime had not been completed at the
time of the first crime's indictment, the government will not be barred from pursuing the second offense in a
subsequent action). Remember, the Diaz exception is not an archaic relic with no lies to the modern world. The
Court in Garrett specifically relied upon this exception. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 791-93: see supra notes 141-67
and accompanying text (detailing the holding of Garrett).
231. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 442.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 448-49.
235. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns raised by the Court in
Garret).
236. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 785-86; id. at 795-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of this argument would be that both modern compound crimes and conspiracies
suffer from similar analytical pitfalls.
237
United States v. Felix expresses the conspiracy exception: "A substantive
crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, are not the 'same offen[s]e' for
double jeopardy purposes."8 By extension, it is possible that the same policies
underlying the conspiracy exception should be applied to the CFCE to
differentiate the "enterprise" from its component predicate offenses, as both
modem compound crimes and conspiracies usually involve numerous persons,
in different places, at different times. Conspiracies, however, are distinguishable
from the CFCE, as conspiracies are completely distinct crimes from any sub-
stantive offenses to which they may be related. 9 A conspiracy may exist without
substantive criminal acts, and a substantive criminal act may be committed
without a conspiracy, whereas that is not so with a modern compound crime.
240
Modem compound crimes and their predicates are intricately intertwined;
substantive criminal acts must have been committed to establish a criminal
"enterprise. 2 4' In fact, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
a modern compound crime is more closely related to underlying predicate
offenses than is a conspiracy.- Upon closer examination, the "conspiracy
exception" is not a true exception at all, but merely an application of
Blockburger.243 Proof of a conspiracy does not require the proof of any
substantive acts, and proof of a substantive offense does not necessarily prove a
conspiracy;2' each provision does not require "proof of a fact which the other
does not."245 For example, compare the federal conspiracy statute with the federal
237. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992). Support may be found for this proposition in the
following quote: "Lesser included offense analysis... is therefore much less helpful in analyzing subsequent
conspiracy prosecutions ... just as it falls short in examining CCE offenses ... based on previously prosecuted
predicate acts." Id.
238. Id. at 389-90.
239. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text (concluding that conspiracies and substantive
offenses are not the same under Blockburger).
240. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996) (setting forth the requirements of a financial crimes
enterprise).
241. See id. (detailing the necessary criminal acts to establish a financial crimes enterprise); Garrett, 471
U.S. at 777 (stating that the modem compound crime of the CCE is not a conspiracy offense as it requires the
completion of the criminal objective, not just an agreement).
242. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778 (noting that the CCE is not distinct from its underlying predicate
offenses in the way that conspiracy to commit a crime differs from the actual substantive offense).
243. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (establishing the so-called conspiracy
exception). The Court stated that the plea of double jeopardy is not a defense to a conviction of both a
substantive offense and the agreement to commit that offense. Id. at 643.
244. See United States v. Shabani, 115 S. Ct. 382, 385 (1994) (holding that to convict a defendant under
21 U.S.C.A. § 846, the Federal Drug Conspiracy Statute, the government need not prove "the commission of
any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy," since there is no explicit requirement of an overt act); Singer
v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 340 (1945) (stating that the Selective Service Act "does not require an overt
act for the offense of conspiracy").
245. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
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mail fraud statute. Conspiracy requires that two or more persons conspire to
commit any offense against the United States.246 In contrast, mail fraud does not
contain this element, and includes substantive acts which are absent from the
conspiracy statute.247 As each statute contains an element which the other does
not, they are not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. Subsequent
prosecutions of a conspiracy to commit a crime and the substantive crime itself
could withstand scrutiny under Blockburger and the lesser included offense
analysis.
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has yet to accept a rule
to protect defendants from double jeopardy in modem compound crime cases, the
Blockburger/lesser included offense rule, coupled with the Diaz and Brown
exceptions, achieves an appropriate balance. Defendants are protected from the
threat of multiple trials springing from the same series of acts, yet the government
may proceed with a prosecution immediately while still preserving its ability to
bring the second charge. The only showing that the government must make to
invoke one of the exceptions is to prove that either the financial crimes enterprise
was not complete at the time of the first indictment or, even after exercising due
diligence, the government was not able to discover the defendant had violated the
CFCE. Yet this is not all that is to be said regarding double jeopardy and the
modem compound offense of the CFCE. Due to the many acts often involved in
a CFCE prosecution, the danger exists that a prosecutor may allege two or more
enterprises exist, when in actuality, only one exists. This would violate the
fundamental proscription of tlie Double Jeopardy Clause: to be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense.248
G. Double Jeopardy Issues When More Than One Enterprise Is Alleged
A second area of concern in the realm of double jeopardy and modem
compound crimes is the danger of prosecutors alleging that the defendant
committed two counts of CFCE from what is, in fact, only a singular "enterprise."
This is not a dilemma when traditional compound crimes are at issue. For
example, with felony-murder,249 if there is but one dead body, the government
may only charge the defendant with one murder. Determining whether there is
only one "body" (enterprise) with the CFCE is far more challenging.
246. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West Supp. 1996).
247. See id. § 1341 (Vest Supp. 1996) (requiring that a defendant use the mail service in the perpetration
of his fraudulent scheme). This is not an element under the fcderal conspiracy statute. Id. § 371 (West Supp.
1996).
248. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
249. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 617 (6th ed. 1990) (delining "felony-murder" as an unintended
death resulting from the commission or attempt of a felony).
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To illustrate this challenge, suppose Mr. X supervises five counts of bank
fraud,250 and five counts of mail fraud 25 against one bank. All of Mr. X's
activities are conducted from the same office, and he has the same group of
subordinates who carry out his orders. Further assume these activities occur in the
same general time frame.
Thereafter, the local United States Attorney's Office separates the five counts
of bank fraud and the five counts of mail fraud into two separate counts under the
CFCE statute. Assume the government could prove the required criteria for each
particular CFCE charge.12 The defendant is tried under the CFCE using the bank
fraud charges as predicate offenses, and then the defendant is convicted and
sentenced. Not satisfied with the sentence received by the defendant, the U.S.
Attorney's Office subsequently prosecutes the defendant under a second CFCE
charge, using the five mail fraud counts as the requisite predicate offenses.
Under the prevailing Blockburger test, the government could prosecute the
defendant in successive trials. This is the case because the proof of the second
CFCE charge (using mail fraud as the predicates) does not necessarily prove the
underlying bank fraud counts prosecuted in the first case, and the first CFCE
charge (using bank fraud as the predicates) does not prove the mail fraud counts.
Without the practical constraints of there being only one "body," there is no limit
to the number of "enterprises" a prosecutor could allege so long as procedural
elements, such as the dollar amount, could be met for each charge. This is so
because under current United States Supreme Court double jeopardy juris-
prudence, there would be nothing to prevent the government from pursuing a case
in this manner, as the only test accepted by the Court for successive prosecutions
is the Blockburger formulation. ' s3
While the United States Supreme Court discussed this dilemma in Braver-
man v. United States,254 and stated that one criminal agreement should not be
250. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West Supp. 1996).
251. Id. § 1343 (West Supp. 1996).
252. The CFCE statute provides that:
(a) whoever-
(1) organizes, manages, or supervises a continuing linancial crimes enterprise; and
(2) receives $5,000,000 or more in gross receipts from such enterprise during any 24-
month period, shall be fined not more than $10.000,000 if an individual, or $20,000,000
if an organization, and imprisoned for a term of not less than 10 years and which may
be life.
b) For purposes of subsection (a), the teni "'continuing financial crimes enterprise" means a series
of violations under section 215, 656. 657, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1032, or 1344 of this title, or
section 1341 or 1343 affecting a financial institution, committed by at least 4 persons acting in
concert.
Id. § 225 (Vest Supp. 1996).
253. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704-05 (1993) (holding that the Blockbnrger test is
deeply rooted in history, and has been accepted in many prior cases, while overruling the same-conduct rule
forwarded by Grady).
254. 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
1323
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 27
fragmented into several conspiracies merely because multiple statutes were
violated, the Court offered no specific method of protection against dividing one
conspiracy into many55 However, at least as early as the late 1970s, federal
appellate courts have determined that, due to the relative ease of fragmenting one
actual conspiracy into several conspiracy charges, the traditional Blockburger
analysis will just not suffice 5 6 In an attempt to confront this issue, many of the
lower federal courts have devised a test for use in cases of alleged multiple
conspiracies, which due to their intrinsic complexity can be of use here, as both
criminal conspiracies and modem compound crimes often involve numerous acts
that occur over a long time span and in many locations.257 Likewise, as the same
policies are at issue,258 several federal circuit courts have adopted similar tests to
confront the problem of prosecutors fragmenting one pattern of racketeering
activity into several RICO violations.
259
Although some formulations differ, most of the tests could fall under the
"totality of the circumstances" rubric,2 by which the court considers several
255. Bravennan, 317 U.S. at 53.
256. See United States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating that the same evidence
test had come under recent criticism in conspiracy cases, and that by choosing one set of overt acts in one
indictment, and another set in a different indictmcnt, the government could "carve one large conspiracy into
several smaller agreements"); United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1978) (arguing that the
same evidence test would allow the construction of multiple conspiracy prosecutions from a single agreement);
United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (?d Cir. 1976) (commenting that the same evidence test is open to
question in conspiracy eases as a prosecutor might be able to pursue multiple indictments based on but a single
conspiracy). Note that all of these federal courts used th term "same evidence test." See Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 522 n.12 (1990) (observing that commentators and judges alike have mistakenly referred to the
Blockburger test as a "same evidence" test, and stating that "[tihis is a misnomer"), overrded by United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). The Court went on to state that the Blockburger test has nothing to do with the
evidence presented at trial, it is only concerned with the statutory elements of the offenses charged. Id. at 522
n.12.
257. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390 (1992) (stating that "conspiracy prosecutions involve
similar allegations of multilayered conduct as to time and place").
258. See United States v. Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 923,930 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that "RICO is not an
anvil on which the government can break an enterprise's over-all pattern of racketeering into discrete parts in
order to obtain more than one chance of conviction").
259. See, e.g., Ciancaglhui, 858 F.2d at 929 (using a totality of the circumstances test to ascertain
whether the same pattern of racketeering activity existed); United States v. Langella, 804 F.2d 185, 189-90 (2d
Cir. 1986) (concluding that two patterns ofracketecring activity existed by using a five part test); United States
v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 788 (8th Cir. 1981) (borrowing a live factor test from multiple conspiracy eases to
determine whether more than one pattern of racketeering activity was present), cer. denied, 456 U.S. 1006
(1982).
260. See United States v. Macchia, 35 F.3d 662,667 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying an eight part test: (I) the
criminal offenses charged in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of participants; (3) the overlap of time;
(4) similarity of operation; (5) the existence of common overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged
conspiracies or location where overt acts occurred; (7) connon objectives; and (8) the degree of
interdependence between alleged distinct conspiracies); United States v. Mintz, 16 F.3d 1101, 1104 (l ath Cir.
1994) (holding that in double jeopardy analyses involving conspiracies, a court must determine whether the
two transactions were interdependent and whether the defendants involved were united in a common goal);
see also United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 736 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (adhering to a five part test similar to
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factors in making its determination as to whether there was one or more con-
spiracies. Interestingly, it seems only one United States Supreme Court Justice
has even considered the use of a species of the totality of the circumstances test
to address the fragmentation dangers faced by Mr. X.
261
To illustrate the application of a totality of the circumstances test, this
Comment will use an inquiry articulated by one of the lower federal courts,
although this opinion was not published. This test examines five factors:
(1) [The time periods covered by the alleged conspiracies; (2) the places
where the conspiracies are alleged to have occurred; (3) the persons
charged as coconspirators; (4) the overt acts alleged to have been
committed in furtherance of the conspiracies, or any other descriptions
of the offenses charged which indicate the nature and scope of the
activities being prosecuted; and (5) the substantive statutes alleged to
have been violated.262
In the case of the CFCE, a court could substitute the words "criminal
enterprise," where "conspiracy" is currently placed, with one slight modification.
The United States Supreme Court unequivochlly rejected the "same conduct"
formulation as a litmus test for double jeopardy violations in United States v.
Dixon.263 Therefore, the inference may be drawn that any test that uses the
similarity of conduct as a factor conflicts with Dixon; thus the fourth variable
listed above cannot enter into the calculus. 264 Applying the remaining elements
of the test to the hypothetical, a court would determine that: The alleged criminal
enterprises occurred in the same time frame; Mr X conducted his business in
largely the same location; the enterprise involved the same people; and Mr. X is
accused of committing similar crimes (two counts of CFCE).
Alentan); United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404,411 (4h Cir. 1993) (adhering to the five step test); United States
v. Okolie, 3 F.3d 287,'290 (8th Cir. 1993) (adopting the five step lest); United States v. Gibbons, 994 F.2d 299,
301 (6th Cir. 1993) (indicating the court will apply the five step test); United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076,
1087 (5th Cir. 1991) (using the five step test to determine whether one or more than one conspiracy exists).
261. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 583-85 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
the breadth of conspiracy indictments provides potential for abuse, and citing a list of appellate cases which
use variants on the totality of the circumstances test when pointing out that the two agreements alleged by the
government were part of the same conspiracy).
262. United States v. Aleman, No. 94-5175, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23689, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 30,
1994).
263. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 703-04 (1993) (stating that Grady forbids successive prosecutions if the
government must prove, to establish essential elements of a crime, the same conduct in subsequent trials, and
then holding that "Grady must be overruled").
264. But see Macchla, 35 F.3d at 668-71 (considering overt acts in its totality of the circumstances
analysis, even after acknowledging that the same conduct test was overruled in Dixon); Miitz, 16 F.3d at 1104
(stating that the Tenth Circuit's multiple conspiracy test was unaffected by Dixon); Nyhuis, 8 F.3d at 734-38
(conceding that the same conduct test was eliminated, and continuing to use overt acts as one of the variables
in a multiple conspiracy test).
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Again, the purpose of the five elements test is to determine whether a singular
criminal "enterprise" existed. Given the above facts, there was only one enter-
prise. Therefore, the government should not be allowed to fragment the charges
in the hypothetical above, and the second prosecution should be barred as
violative of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy.
The application of a "totality of the circumstances" test to cases of alleged
multiple modem compound crimes would guard against the fragmentation of one
offense into several,265 which, as illustrated above, is possible under a
Blockburger test. In sum, without the practical limitations inherently imposed
upon traditional compound crimes such as felony-murder, a more comprehensive
"totality of the circumstances" test is needed in cases of alleged multiple criminal
enterprises.
H. Collateral Estoppel
The settled doctrine of collateral estoppel effectively protects a defendant
under the first prong of Pearce, prohibiting a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal. 26 If Mr. X was charged with bank fraud against Bank A
in 1992 and acquitted, collateral estoppel would likely bar the relitigation of those
same bank fraud issues in a subsequent CFCE trial.
The definition of collateral estoppel is quite basic: when an issue of ultimate
fact has been determined by a valid judgement, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties. 267 The United States Supreme Court held that this
principle is a component of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Ashe v. Swenson.
268
Therefore, if Mr. X was acquitted on the underlying bank fraud charges, the
government probably could not use those same bank fraud charges as predicates
in a later CFCE prosecution.
General verdicts prevent the absolute invocation of collateral estoppel to
prohibit subsequent prosecution under the CFCE.269 Under Ashe, if the acquittal
was obtained through a general verdict, the court should examine the record of
265. See Poulin, supra note 37, at 120 (describing the benefits of the totality of the circumstances test
over a traditional Blockburger analysis: "The totality of circumstances test was developed to prohibit the
fragmentation that Blockburger allows").
266. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (announcing that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal).
267. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783,790 (1994); see id. (stating that collateral estoppel means that when
an issue of ultimate fact has already been determined in a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated by the same parties in a subsequent action); BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
"collateral estoppel" as a bar to subsequent litigation since the issue has already been adjudicated in a court
of law).
268. 397 U.S. 436 (1970); see id. at 444-45 (holding that the established rule of collateral estoppel is
embodied in the Fifth Amendment).
269. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (noting that collateral estoppel in criminal cases should not be applied
in a hyper technical manner, in light of general verdicts).
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the prior proceeding, and determine whether the jury could have grounded its
verdict upon an issue other than the one the defendant wants to foreclose from
consideration. If the jury predicated its acquittal on issues other than whether
the defendant committed acts constituting the elements of the offense, the govern-
ment is not estopped.27' Applied to the Mr. X hypothetical, if an examination of
the trial record reveals that the jury could have rationally acquitted the defendant
because it believed that Bank A was not a "financial institution" as defined in the
bank fraud statute,272 then the government could use the bank fraud charges in the
CFCE prosecution, if the conduct also defrauded Banks B and C.273 On the other
hand, if the only issue before the jury was whether Mr. X committed bank fraud
at all, then collateral estoppel would attach, and the subsequent prosecution would
be barred.274
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether
collateral estoppel principles should apply to modern compound crimes and their
predicates, it seems that the policies underlying the rule are not subject to the
same problems the Court considered fatal to applying the lesser included offense
analysis to modern compound crimes. 27S Note that the definition of collateral
estoppel does not require that the activity for which the defendant was previously
acquitted for, be the "same offense" as the present crime. 6 As discussed above,
this seems to have been determinative to the justices; they could not fathom that
a modern compound crime and its predicates could possibly be the "same
offense. ' '27 Furthermore, some commentators have suggested that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is independent of substantive criminal law. 78 Hence, the
theoretical problems that the United States Supreme Court has had with defining
a modem compound crime and its predicates as the "same offense" simply do not
come into play.279 It would not be necessary for a defendant to couch the
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West Supp. 1996) (defining a "financial institution" as any one of a variety
of banks or credit unions).
273. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (stating that collateral estoppel does not bar a subsequent prosecution
after an acquittal on a general verdict if the jury could have rationally grounded its decision on an issue other
than the one the defendant seeks to have foreclosed).
274. Id. at 445.
275. See supra notes 141-76 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme Court's
reluctance to consider modern compound crimes and their predicate greater and lesser included offenses,
respectively).
276. See supra note 267 (defining "collateral estoppel").
277. See supra notes 141-76 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme Court's
reluctance to consider modern compound crimes and their predicates greater and lesser included offenses,
respectively).
278. See Brenner, supra note 19, at 990 (stating that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is independent
of substantive criminal law).
279. See supra notes 141-76 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
concerns regarding modem compound crimes and Double Jeopardy issues).
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defendant's arguments in terms of being put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. The defendant would merely need to show that an issue of ultimate fact
has been proven in his favor, that is, he has been acquitted of an underlying
predicate offense, a necessary component of the present CFCE charge. As a
result, it seems likely that the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be available
to a defendant as a shield against improper charges under the CFCE.
L Prosecutorial Guidelines: Substance or Window Dressing?
As one final note regarding double jeopardy and modem compound crimes,
some may assert that a prosecutor, using prosecutorial discretion, will simply not
choose to pursue the aforementioned Mr. X in the manner(s) described above,
despite the fact that the prosecution would not be constrained by the present
interpretation of the United States Constitution. In fact, there are currently pro-
secutorial guidelines that address this very matter.
Section 9-2.142 of the United States Attorneys' Manual prohibits successive
prosecution of substantially the same act, acts or transaction following a prior
federal prosecution, unless there is a compelling federal interest supporting the
second prosecution.2 10 The manual does not state precisely what a compelling
interest is, but it does list certain crimes which may be "compelling;" these crimes
include civil rights cases, tax cases, and organized crime cases.
28'
The genesis of the policy was the case of Petite v. United States,282 in which
the Solicitor General stated the general policy of the federal government as:
"several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and tried
together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions.
28 3
Despite the laudable goals proclaimed by the Solicitor General, and
manifested in the internal policy of the Justice Department, the internal regu-
lations of the Justice Department confer no substantive rights upon defendants.
28
Most importantly, the United States Supreme Court announced in Rinaldi v.
United States285 that the Petite policy'is "not constitutionally mandated. 2 86 In
280. U.S. Atty's Manual § 9-2.142 (1992).
281. See id. § 9-2.142 n.8 (stating that whether or not a compelling interest is at stake depends upon the
facts and circumstances of each case, but the manual does list certain priority cases, such as civil rights cases,
organized crime cases, tax cases, fireamis cases, and cases involving crimes against federal officials, witnesses
or informants).
282. 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
283. See Petite, 361 U.S. at 530 (stating that the policy in question is dictated by fairness to the
defendant, and to promote efficient and orderly law enforcement). Interestingly, this mirrors the broad "same
transaction" test advocated by Justice Brennan, but never accepted by a majority ofjustices. Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 439,453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
284. 'See U.S. Atty's Manual § 9-2.142(B)(3) (1992) (maintaining that the policy regarding successive
prosecutions set forth in the manual are for internal guidance only, and no substantive rights are to be created).
285. 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
286. Rinald, 434 U.S. at 29.
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addition, several federal Courts of Appeals have concluded that no substantive
rights are at issue when the Petite policy is violated.287 Therefore, a defendant is
ultimately still at the mercy of prosecutors, rendering inert the constitutional
safeguards of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Notwithstanding the fact that the
Petite policy does not grant substantive rights to defendants, even establishing a
violation may be difficult enough. The Petite policy is waived when a compelling
federal interest exists that supports the subsequent prosecution. 288 Although there
is only a sparse amount of case law on the matter, courts have given a tremendous
amount of deference to the Department of Justice in determining what constitutes
a compelling federal interest.2 89 With free reign to define compelling interests, it
is not out of the question that the Justice Department could make a circular
assertion in the case of the CFCE. This argument would look to the severity of the
penalties available under the CFCE (up to life imprisonment and a $10 million
fine for an individual)290 and conclude that Congress has shown, through these
harsh penalties, that it deems the apprehension and punishment of financial
kingpins to be vitally important. As a result, a prosecution under the CFCE is per
se compelling.
Of course, in the final analysis of the Petite policy, even assuming a
defendant could hurdle the substantial obstacle of proving a violation, such a
triumph would be a pyrrhic victory, as defendants simply have no remedy.29' In
leaving the decision of whether to pursue the CFCE and its predicates in
successive trials completely up to prosecutors, the very purpose of constitutional
proscriptions is subverted. If the framers thought governmental actions would
always comport with the preservation of personal liberty, they would not have
crafted the Bill of Rights.
287. See United States v. Kummer, 15 F.3d 1455, 1461 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Petite policy
does not generally confer substantive rights); United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1156 (7th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that the Petite policy does not give a defendant substantive rights as it is only an internal
government guideline).
288. U.S. Atty's Manual § 9-2.142 (1992).
289. See Kununer, 15 F.3d at 1461 (addressing the question of whether the government had the requisite
6ompelling interest, the court stated that they lacked the power to review decisions made by the Department
of Justice); United States v. Perales, 838 F. Supp. 196,201 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (stating in conclusory dicta that,
"it is obvious that the federal government has a compelling interest"). The "obvious" compelling interest
entailed stemming the escalation of drug-related offenses. Id. at 201.
290. 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West Supp. 1996).
291. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text (illuminating the fact that no substantive rights are
implicated with the Petite policy).
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IV. CONCLUSION
By refusing to extend even the minimal safeguards of the Blockburger test
to modem compound crimes such as the CFCE and their predicates,292 the United
States Supreme Court has placed defendants at the mercy of the system, with no
check on prosecutorial discretion. While prosecutors, in the main, are men and
women of extraordinary integrity, both society and the United States Supreme
Court have acknowledged that citizens need a buffer to protect against the abuse
of their power. More often than not, the necessary buffer has taken the form of
constitutional protection embodied in the Bill of Rights. Specifically at issue
during this Comment has been the Fifth Amendment's proscription against
double jeopardy. Through its decisions, the United States Supreme Court has
eliminated one layer of protection for defendants especially at risk of the double
jeopardy dangers feared by the framers. 293 Without the shield of the Fifth
Amendment to protect them, defendants accused of modem compound crimes can
only hope that prosecutors adhere to internal guidelines, and abide by their creed
to do justice.
292. See supra notes 141-76 and accompanying text (reviewing United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area, and concluding that the Court has crafted a modern compound crime exception to
traditional double jeopardy analysis).
293. See supra notes 141-76 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions related
to double jeopardy).
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